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Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imper-
fect monitoring has restricted attention to public strategies;s t r a t e g i e st h a t
only depend on history of publicly observable signals, and perfect public
equilibria (PPE); sequential equilibria in public strategies. The present
paper sheds light on the role of private strategies; strategies that depend
on players’ own actions in the past as well as observed public signals. Our
main ﬁnding is that players can sometimes make better use of information
by using private strategies and eﬃciency in repeated games can often be
drastically improved. We illustrate this for games with a small signal
space, where the Folk Theorem fails, as well as for games with a large
signal space, for which the Folk Theorem holds. Our private strategy
consists of two states and has the property that the opponent’s incentives
are independnt of the state the player is in. We provide two diﬀerent char-
acterizations of our two-state equilibrium for general two-person repeated
games with imperfect public monitoring.
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egy, Partnership Game, Private Equilibrium, Private Strategy, Repeated
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The theory of repeated games under imperfect monitoring provides a formal
framework to explore the possibility of cooperation in long term relationships,
∗This paper stems from the two independent papers: “Check Your Partner’s Behavior by
Randomization: New Eﬃciency Results on Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring” [6]
by Michihiro Kandori and “Private Strategy and Eﬃciency: Repeated Partnership Games
Revisited” [14] by Ichiro Obara. An old version of this paper was included in Chapter 1 of
the doctoral thesis of the second author, who is very grateful to George Mailath and Andrew
Postlewaite for their advice and support. We also thank many participants in numerous
conferences and workshops. All the remaining errors are ours.
1where each agent’s action is not directly observable. It has been successfully
applied to a number of economic problems: cartel enforcement, internal labor
market, and international policy coordination, to name a few. However, almost
all existing works (including Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [2] and Fudenberg,
Levine and Maskin [4]) focus on a simple class of strategies, known as public
strategies. In the present paper, we illustrate that players can make better use
of information by using non-public strategies, which we call private strategies,
and show that eﬃciency in repeated games can often be drastically improved.
A public strategy is a strategy which only depends on past realizations of
the public signal. In contrast, a private strategy can also depend on private
history; one’s own actions in the past. Our private strategy is a mixed1 strategy
which has the following feature: a player’s continuation strategy depends on the
realization of his or her mixed actions in the past. For example, take a model of
dynamic Cournot competition with stochastic demand (Green and Porter [5]).
In this context, our private strategy has the property that each ﬁrm randomly
chooses its present output level and the realized output aﬀects the future output
level.
A rough intuition for the improved eﬃciency by private strategies may be
obtained by the following observation. It is often the case that a player has
a socially ineﬃcient action that helps to monitor other players’ actions more
accurately. For example, in a team production (or partnership) problem with
decreasing returns to scale, observable output can be more sensitive to the oppo-
nent’s eﬀort, when a player’s eﬀort is low. Hence, if such “monitoring” action
is played with a small probability and the opponents are rewarded/punished
only after such an action is taken, the opponents’ moral hazard problem can
be resolved in a more eﬃc i e n tw a y . N o t et h a ti nt h i ss t o r yi ti sv i t a lt h a t
the players’ future behavior (reward/punishment) depends on their past actions
(hence the use of private strategies).
Let us explain our point in more detail with an explicit example. Con-
sider a simple repeated partnership game with two actions {C,D}, two pub-
lic signals {“good”,“bad”}, where the stage game (expected) payoﬀ matrix
has the structure of the standard prisoners’ dilemma. Assume that one’s ef-
fort (to play C) reduces the likelihood of “bad” by a larger margin when the
opponent is making no eﬀort (i.e., when he is taking D). This can be re-
garded as the decreasing returns to scale we discussed, and it is formulated as
Pr(“bad”|C,C)+ε =P r( “ bad”|C,D)=P r( “ bad”|D,C) << Pr(“bad”|D,D),
where ε > 0 is a small number. First note that cooperation cannot be sustained
with the standard trigger strategy when ε is very small because the public signal
is insensitive to a deviation when (C,C) is played. One way to get around this
problem within the class of public strategies is to use a mixed trigger strategy;
mix D with some probability in the cooperative phase. Although playing D
with positive probability causes ineﬃciency in the stage game payoﬀs, the public
signal becomes more sensitive to deviations. This may allow players to use a
1It is well known that public strategies achieve the same equilibrium outcomes as private
s t r a t e g i e s ,i fw ec o n s i d e rp u r es t r a t e g i e s . S e ef o o t n o t e7f o rt h ep r e c i s es t a t e m e n t .
2mutual punishment after the public signal “bad” to sustain a certain level of co-
operation.2,3 N o wn o t et h a tw ec a ni m p r o v ee ﬃciency further by using private
strategies. When a player is randomizing between C and D, the most informa-
tive action-signal pair with respect to a deviation is (D,“bad”). Therefore it
is more eﬃcient to start a punishment only after (D,“bad”). In contrast, the
trigger strategies based only on public information are less eﬃcient, because the
punishment can occur even when C is played, that is, when the public signal
is not informative at all. Our ﬁrst contribution is to point out that such an
advantage exists in private strategies.
Our second contribution is to ﬁnd a method to construct a private equilib-
rium which manifests the above intuition. Note that, with private strategies,
each player may not know the other player’s continuation strategy because it
depends on the realizations of past private actions. Hence, players have to com-
pute their beliefs (by Bayes’ rule) about what the opponents are going to do,
and the computation generally becomes fairly complex over time.4 Thus it is
not an easy task to construct an equilibrium which manifests the above idea.
To see this, note that the punishment by the private strategy in the above ex-
ample cannot be a coordinated action. When you are supposed to punish the
other player, you are not sure whether the other player is also going to punish
you. Hence your incentive to punish generally depends on your belief about the
opponent’s future actions, which changes over time in a complex way. It is thus
not obvious how we can provide the right incentive to implement punishment
at the right moment.
Our private strategy can be regarded as a machine which consists of two
states; rewarding state and punishment state. A player may play a mixed
action at each state, and the transition probability between the states depend
on a realization of action-signal pair. Note that there is always uncertainty
regarding the other player’s strategy as we pointed out above. At each point
of time, each player may not know which state the other player is in, or which
continuation strategy is used by the other player. The trick is to choose the right
mixed actions and the right transition probabilities to make one’s incentives
identical (and adequate to support equilibrium actions), no matter which state
the other player is in. Such construction makes one’s belief about what the
other player is going to do irrelevant, in the sense that one’s action is optimal
independent of her belief.
This idea is very powerful in dealing with private information. Indeed it
can deal with not only private information about past actions but also private
signals, if any. A similar idea was ﬁrst applied by Piccione [16] in the framework
of repeated games with private monitoring. Two-state machine strategies were
2The level of punishment can be adjusted so that players are actually indiﬀerent between
C and D.
3Note that the eﬃciency can be improved even within the class of public strategies by
using a mixed strategy. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been pointed out in the
existing literature.
4This is the same diﬃculty as the diﬀﬁculy in repeated games with private monitoring.
See Kandori [7].
3ﬁrst independently found by Ely and Välimäki [3] in repeated games with private
monitoring, and by Obara [14] on which this paper is based.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe our model and provide a
brief review of previous results in Section 2. In Section 3, we show that private
equilibria are more eﬃcient than PPE under a certain conditions for games with
a small signal space. We use a version of partnership games for which the Folk
Theorem fails as shown by Radner, Myerson, and Maskin[17]. In Section 4, we
illustrate that our result holds even for games with a large signal space. Again
we use a partnership game, but with a rich signal space this time. Our model
satisﬁes the suﬃcient condition of the Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin Folk theorem,
thus the eﬃciency is approximately achieved by PPE as δ → 1. However, we
show that our equilibrium approximates eﬃciency faster, and is always more
eﬃcient than any PPE as long as there exists any nontrivial PPE. Section 5
provides two diﬀerent characterizations of our two-state machine equilibrium for
general two-person repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Section
6 discusses related literature and concludes.
2 The Model and Review of Previous Results
In this section we present a general model of repeated games with imperfect
public monitoring and review some of the existing results. Throughout the
paper we consider two-player games. In the stage game, each player i =1 ,2
chooses an action ai ∈ Ai, and they publicly observe a signal ω ∈ Ω.W e
assume that Ai and Ω are ﬁnite sets and let p(ω|a) denote the probability of
signal ω g i v e na c t i o np r o ﬁle a ∈ A = A1 × A2. The realized payoﬀ to player i
is ui(ai,ω) ( s ot h a ti tc o n v e y sn om o r ei n f o r m a t i o nt h a nai and ω do), and the
expected payoﬀ is given by gi(a)=
P
ω∈Ω ui(ai,ω)p(ω|a).D e n o t e i’s mixed
action by αi ∈ ∆i, and with an abuse of notation, let gi(α) be player i’s expected
payoﬀ associated with mixed action proﬁle α ∈ ∆1 × ∆2.W ea l s ol e tp(·|α) be
probability distribution on public signals given α ∈ ∆1 × ∆2. The stage game
is played over an inﬁnite time horizon t =0 ,1,2,..., and player i’s (average)
payoﬀ in the repeated game is given by (1 − δ)
P∞
t=0 δ
tgi(a(t)),w h e r ea(t) is
the action proﬁle at time t and δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor.
The existing literature restricts attention to public strategies, where action at
time t depends only on the history of publicly observable signal (ω(0),...,ω(t−1)).
A sequential equilibria in public strategies5 is called a perfect public equilibrium
(PPE), and the structure of this class of equilibria is now well understood.
Roughly speaking, eﬃciency can be achieved in this class as δ → 1, if the signal
space is large enough (the Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin folk theorem [4]). More
precisely, when |Ω| ≥ |A1| + |A2| − 1, for a generic choice of payoﬀs and signal
distributions6, any feasible and individually rational payoﬀ proﬁle can be as-
ymptotically achieved by a PPE as δ → 1 (the Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin folk
5Deviations to non-public strategies are allowed.
6This is because Fudenberg-Levine-Maskin’s full rank conditions and full dimensionality
condition are satisﬁed generically.
4theorem). When the signal space is small, in contrast, there are well-known
examples where the public perfect equilibria do not achieve eﬃciency (Radner,
Myerson, and Maskin [17]).
In the present paper, we consider a more general class of strategies, where
action at time t depends on the history of publicly observable signal and his
o w na c t i o n( ω(0),...,ω(t − 1),a i(0),...,a i(t − 1)). Such a strategy is called
private, and a sequential equilibrium in private strategies is called a private
equilibrium(PE).7 We demonstrate that private equilibria can outperform PPE
in either case discussed above.8 Namely, for the case where the folk theorem
fails, we show that private equilibria can be fully or almost eﬃcient when PPE
are far away from the Pareto frontier for all δ ∈ (0,1). E v e nw h e nt h ef o l k
theorem holds, we show that private equilibria can be strictly more eﬃcient
than PPE for each suﬃciently large δ < 1, although in the limit δ → 1 they
both achieve eﬃciency.
3 The Advantage of Private Strategies in Games
with a Small Signal Space
We ﬁrst examine the case where the signal space is small, so that eﬃciency
cannot be achieved by PPE (the folk theorem fails). We present a series of
examples where private equilibria outperform PPE, each of which is a special
case of the following model.
The stage game is a symmetric game with Ω = {X,Y} and A1 = A2 =
{C,D}. (Note that the folk theorem condition |Ω| ≥ |A1|+|A2|−1 fails.) We




where d,h > 0 (D is dominant) and d − h<1 ((C,C) is eﬃcient, that is, it
Pareto-dominates the equal (public) randomization between (C,D) and (D,C)).
We also assume that the signalling structure is symmetric (p(ω|C,D)=p(ω|D,C)).
This is a simpliﬁed version of the model examined by Radner, Myerson and
Maskin [17] (RMM from now on).9
We derive an upper bound of the PPE payoﬀs as a benchmark. Our analysis
is a generalization of RMM [17] and Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce [1] (AMP from
now on). The main diﬀerence is that we consider mixed strategies, while those
7These terms “private strategy” and “private equilibrium” are ﬁrst coined in Obara [14].
8Note that it would be without loss of generality to restrict attention to public strategies if
we were to consider only pure strategies (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [2]). More precicely,
for any pure strategy, there exists a payoﬀ equivalent public pure strategy. Since a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium is a PPE when the signal distribution has a full support, we need to
use a mixed strategy (whose behavior strategy representation is private) in order to outperform
PPE.
9The action set is continuum in Radner, Myerson, and Maskin [17].
5papers only consider pure strategies. Besides ﬁnding an upper bound, this
analysis serve two other purposes. First, we demonstrate a reason why the best
PPE is sometimes in mixed strategies, which has not been pointed out before.
Second, this fact helps to understand a general reason why private strategies
can outperform public strategies (see Remark in Sections 3.2).
We ﬁrst consider the best trigger strategy equilibrium payoﬀ to sustain a
symmetric proﬁle (αq,αq) where αq is the mixed action playing D with (small)
probability q ∈ [0,1).L e t ω(q) ∈ Ω = {X,Y}, be the signal satisfying
p(ω(q)|D,αq) >p (ω(q)|C,αq). It is the signal to detect player i’s proﬁtable
deviation (D) from the proﬁle (αq,αq).





(1): Play (αq,αq) in the stage game.
(2): If ω 6= ω(q) is observed, go back to (1)
If ω(q) is observed, start playing (D,D) forever with
probability ρ and go back to (1) with probability 1 − ρ.
The average symmetric payoﬀ vq satisﬁes the dynamic programming equations11
vq =( 1− δ)g(C,αq)+δ(1 − ρp(ω(q)|C,αq))vq (1)
and
vq ≥ (1 − δ)g(D,αq)+δ(1 − ρp(ω(q)|D,αq))vq. (2)
If αq mixes C and D, they must provide an equal payoﬀ so that (2) is satisﬁed
with equality. If αq plays C with probability one (q =0 ), (2) may not be
binding. However, to obtain the best equilibrium, we need to choose the small-
est probability of punishment ρ so that (2) is binding. From the two dynamic
programming equalities, we obtain a closed form expression of the equilibrium
payoﬀ





dq = g(D,αq) − g(C,αq) (4)








is the likelihood ratio which measures the degree of observability of deviation.
Plugging into (3) the values in the payoﬀ table, we obtain
vq =1− q − hq −
(1 − q)d + qh
Lq − 1
. (6)
10We allow the use of public randomization device for PPE, but not for PE, and still show
that PE can Pareto-domate PPE.
11Note that we used player 1’s payoﬀ without loss of generality, as the payoﬀ is symmetric.
6Let q∗ ∈ argmaxq∈[0,1] vq. Then vq∗
is the best trigger strategy equilibrium
payoﬀ (indeed the best strongly symmetric equilibrium payoﬀ) if and only if it
is positive (otherwise, (0,0) is the best strongly symmetric equilibrium payoﬀ).12
Note that this formula is independent of δ, thus implies that any trigger strategy
equilibrium payoﬀ is ineﬃcient (< 1) how patient players are.
Note that this formula reduces to APM [1]’s formula for the best (pure)
trigger strategy equilibrium payoﬀ when q =0 . We can interpret 1 − q − hq
as the stage game payoﬀ in the cooperative phase and the last term
(1−q)d+qh
Lq−1
as the eﬃciency loss which stems from imperfect monitoring and unnecessary
punishments. This formula clariﬁes why mixed (public) strategies may help to
improve eﬃciency. While taking the ineﬃcient action D with a larger proba-
bility q reduces the stage game payoﬀ (g(C,αq)), it may improve the quality of
monitoring (increase Lq) and reduce the ineﬃciency associated with unneces-
sary punishments (it may also reduce the deviation gain dq). So q∗ may not be
0 in general, that is, the mixed trigger strategy may achieve a better outcome.
Indeed it is very easy to construct a such example.
In order to get the bound of all the PPE payoﬀs, we also need to take
into account cases where the optimal strategy pair is asymmetric. Let us
deﬁne ωi(α) ∈ {X,Y } by p(ωi(α)|D,α−i) >p (ωi(α)|C,α−i). This is the sig-
nal outcome to detect Player i’s defection at mixed action proﬁle α.W h e n
ω1(α) 6= ω2(α),d i ﬀerent players’ deviations can be statistically distinguished,
and asymmetric punishment can enforce the given action α without welfare
loss. Namely, when ω1(α) is realized, we transfer future payoﬀsf r o mp l a y e r1
to player 2 (symmetric argument applies to ω2(α)). Such a movement of future
payoﬀs can be made in a close vicinity of the Pareto frontier when δ is large,
so that the associated welfare loss is negligible. This is the key observation to
derive the folk theorem (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [?]). Now let Q be the
set of α such that ω1(α) 6= ω2(α) ∈ {X,Y}. The actions in Q can be sustained
by the eﬃcient asymmetric punishment, so that the sum of equilibrium payoﬀs




It turns out that the sum of all PPE payoﬀs are bounded by one of the
following four numbers; 2vq∗, the sum of asymmetric eﬃcient points 1+d − h,
g∗,o rt h eN a s hp a y o ﬀ 0, whichever is the largest in the following sense:
Proposition 1 Any PPE payoﬀ proﬁle (v1,v 2) satisﬁes V ∗ = v1 + v2,w h e r e






12A public strategy is strongly symmetric if players play the same action after every public
history.
13We can drop the symmetry assumption for signalling structure. This proposition is still
valid if 2vq∗




























deﬁned in a similar way to (4) and (5))
7Proof. See Appendix.
It is easy to construct examples for which each of these becomes the eﬀective
upper bound of v1+v2. Note that when 2vq
∗
= V ∗, it can be exactly achieved by





Kandori and Obara [10] shows a couple of examples for which V ∗ = g∗, and g∗
is not exactly achieved (Section 2) or exactly achieved (Section 4).
3.1 An Example of Eﬃcient Private Equilibria
We ﬁrst present a special case of the above model, where private equilibria
asymptotically achieves full eﬃciency, while PPE payoﬀs are bounded away
from the eﬃciency frontier.
Let us assume 0 <p (X|C,C) < 1, 0 <p (X|D,D) < 1, and p(X|C,D)=
p(X|D,C)=0 . Under this information structure, no PPE can approximate
the eﬃcient point (1,1). This is formally shown as follows. By Proposition 1,
for (1,1) to be achieved by a PPE, the best trigger payoﬀ vq should be equal
to 1. Expression (6) shows that this requires q =0(C is played for sure in
the ﬁrst period) and L0 = ∞ (deviation to D is perfectly detected), but this is
impossible: As deviation to D makes ω = Y more likely when q =0 ,w eh a v e
ω(0) = Y and L0 =
P(Y |D,C)
p(Y |C,C) = 1
p(Y |C,C) < ∞.
In contrast, the eﬃcient payoﬀ proﬁle can be approximated by the following





(1): Mix between C and D.C h o o s e a c t i o n D
with a (small) probability q ∈ (0,1).
(2): If the signal is X and one’s own action was D,
then play D forever. Otherwise, go back to (1).
Note well that (i) the players’ future actions partly depend on their current
actions (so that it is a private strategy) and (ii) thanks to the assumption
p(X|C,D)=p(X|D,C)=0 , when a player chose D and observes X,i ti s
common knowledge that the other player also chose D (and of course observes
X). The equilibrium conditions are
v =( 1− δ)(1 − q − qh)+δv (7)
v =( 1− δ)(1− q)(1+d)+δ {1 − qp(X|D,D)}v (8)
Equation (7) represents the average payoﬀ when a player plays C today
(while the opponent is employing the above strategy). Note that punishment is
surely avoided in this case, as defection is triggered if and only if both players
play D and the signal is X. Equation (8) shows the average payoﬀ when the
player chooses D today. Punishment is triggered when the opponent also chooses
D and the signal is X, which happens with probability qp(X|D,D).E q u a t i o n
(7) and (8), taken together, imply that the player is just indiﬀerent between
choosing C and D (the condition for a mixed strategy equilibrium).
8From (7), we have
v =1− q − qh (9)
Also, by (7) and (8) we get
(1 − δ){(1 − q)d + qh} = δqp(X|D,D)v. (10)
This and (9) result in a quadratic equation in q;
(1 − δ){(h − d)q + d} = δqp(X|D,D)(1 − q − qh) (11)
It is easy to show that there is a root of this equation in (0,1) which tends to
0 as δ → 1. Equation (9) then implies that, as q tends to 0, the average payoﬀ
tends to 1, the payoﬀ from full cooperation. This leads us to the following result.
Proposition 2 In the game deﬁned above, there is a private equilibrium that
approximately attains the fully eﬃcient average payoﬀ (=1 )a st h ed i s c o u n tf a c -
tor tends to unity, while any perfect public equilibrium average payoﬀ is bounded
away from 1 independent of the discount factor.
Proof. See Appendix
Remark (The Essential Idea of Our Paper): Since it is much easier to
detect the other player’s defection when one defects herself, it is more eﬃcient
to trigger a punishment only after such a (private) history. More precisely,
private strategies allow players to start a punishment only after a realization
of action-signal pair for which the likelihood ratio with respect to a defection
is maximized. This high likelihood ratio helps to reduce the ineﬃciency term
in the formula we obtained before. For this particular example, indeed the
ineﬃciency term vanished completely because the likelihood ratio is inﬁnity. It
is based on a simple familiar principle: the eﬃcient statistical inference, which
is one of the main underlying theme in any moral hazard model. Note that
public strategies can also use this high likelihood ratio to some extent, but D
needs to be played with a very high probability to do so at the cost of reducing
eﬃciency in stage games. We can avoid this kind of trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency
and detectability by utilizing private strategies. This is the essential idea why
private strategies can outperform public strategies.
The reader may wonder why the kind of private strategies presented above,
based on a simple intuition, have rarely appeared in the existing literature.
The answer hinges on the assumption of the moving support in this particular
example. It allows players to coordinate their punishments after playing D and
observing X. In another word, a realization of the action-signal pair which
triggers punishment is common knowledge. Suppose that X is observed with
probability ε when (C,D) or (D,C) is played. If ε is very small, this information
structure is very close to the information structure of our example. However,
our simple private trigger strategy is not an equilibrium any more. The problem
is that cooperation/punishment is not common knowledge once X is observed.
9Each player cannot be sure whether the opponent is in the punishment mode
or in the cooperation mode. Such an inference problem becomes increasingly
more complex as time passes by, even though the opponent is using a fairly
simple strategy as above. As a result, specifying the best action in each period
is usually a formidable task (and the action speciﬁed by our trigger strategy is
suboptimal after certain histories).14 The complexity of inference is the most
diﬃcult problem associated with private strategies, and this is why this class of
strategies has not been fully explored. We present a way to address this issue
in the next sub-section.
3.2 Two-State Machine Private Equilibria
In this section, we demonstrate how to construct a private equilibrium when
the signal has full support. We assume that
0 <p(X|CC) <p(X|DC)=p(X|CD) <p(X|DD) < 1
The idea is that “bad” signal X is more likely to realize as more players defect.
This is similar to the information structure in RMM [?]o ra n yo t h e rs t a n d a r d








Note that this implies a form of decreasing returns to scale.15. Let us denote
p(X|CC)=p0, p(X|CD)=p(X|DC)=p1, and p(X|DD)=p2 in this




Now consider the following private strategy, which we call a “two-state ma-
chine”. The strategy has two states, R and P, and it begins with state R.
Furthermore, it has the following structure:
• State R (State to Reward the opponent):
Choose D with probability qR (a small number). Go to state P with
probability ρR ∈ (0,1) if D was taken and X was observed (otherwise,
stay in State R).
• State P (State to punish the opponent):
Choose D with probability qP (a large number). Go to state R with
probability ρP ∈ (0,1) if D was taken and Y was observed (otherwise,
stay in State P).
Figure 2 describes this machine graphically.
14For example, since a player is indiﬀerent between playing C and playing D only if she
believes that her opponent is cooperating with probability 1, she cannot stay in the cooperative
p h a s ee v e na f t e rs h ec h o s eC and observed X.
15The probability of “success” Y is increasing more for the ﬁrst imput of eﬀort, that is,










q  is very small
(D,Y)
R: reward state P: punishment state
RP q











First note that this private strategy has the same feature as the one in the
previous section. Each player moves to state P only after (D,X);t h em o s t
informative action-signal pair of defection, as (12) shows. Similarly, players
move to state R only after (D,Y), which turns out to be the most informative
action-signal pair of cooperation. Second, note that there is a strategic uncer-
tainty we described before. A player is not sure whether the other player is
in state R or state P from the second period (and never will). How can we
check if this machine is a best response strategy at every history given such a
ever-changing belief? To resolve this problem, we choose (qR,q P,ρR,ρP) in
such a way that no matter which state player 2 is in, player 1 is always indiﬀer-
ent between choosing C and choosing D. This means that any repeated game
strategy is a best response to the machine, hence so is the machine itself.
Since the game and the strategy is symmetric, subscript i is omitted from
here on as long as it does not cause any confusion. A set of parameters
(qR,q P,ρR,ρP) is chosen to satisfy the following four equations. When player
2i si ns t a t eR , the equilibrium conditions for player 1 are
• (player 1 plays C today)
VR =( 1− δ)(1− qR − qRh)+δ {(1 − qRp1ρR)VR + qRp1ρRVP} (13)
and
11• (player 1 plays D today).
VR =( 1− δ)(1− qR)(1+d)+δ{(1 − qRp2ρR)VR + qRp2ρRVP} (14)
When player 2 is in state P , the equilibrium conditions for player 1 are
• (player 1 plays C today)
VP =( 1− δ)(1− qP − qPh)+δ
·
qP (1 − p1)ρPVR




• (player 1 plays D today)
VP =( 1− δ)(1− qP)(1+d)+δ
·
qP (1 − p2)ρPVR
+{1 − qp (1 − p2)ρP}VP
¸
(16)
where VZ can be interpreted as the discounted average payoﬀ f o rp l a y e r1
when player 2 is in state z = R,P.
Equations (13) and (14) imply that player 1 is indiﬀerent between C and
D when player 2 is in state R and if her continuation payoﬀ is completely
determined by her opponent’s state. Similarly, (15) and (16) imply that player
1 is indiﬀerent between C and D when player 2 is in state P. A system of
these equations implies that player 1 is completely indiﬀerent among all the
repeated game strategies, thus player 2’s state indeed determines player 1’s
continuation payoﬀ completely as we assumed. Any payoﬀ diﬀerence one can
make in the current period is exactly oﬀset by the diﬀerence of the continuation
payoﬀs caused by the change of the other player’s transition probability. Let us
emphasize again that a player never knows what is the opponent’s continuation
strategy or which state the opponent is in during the game. However, players
do not have to know them because their expected payoﬀsc a n n o tb ea ﬀected by
their own strategies. Note that this logic is somewhat similar to the one for
a totally mixed strategy equilibrium in a ﬁnite normal form game. What is
interesting here is that the same thing is done for an inﬁnite game with only a
ﬁnite number of equations and value functions.
The above system of equilibrium conditions consists of four equations (13)-
(16) and six unknowns (VZ,q∗
Z,ρ∗
Z,Z= R,P). We can show that, when δ is
close to 1, this system has a solution such that (i) the probabilities (q∗
Z,ρ∗
Z,Z= R,P)
are in [0,1], and (ii) q∗
R → 0 as δ → 1.16 By a manipulation similar to the








L1−1 . Hence the property (ii) means that the
payoﬀ arbitrary close to 1 − d
L1−1 is achieved as a PE as δ → 1.
16It turns out that q∗
p can be set to 1.
12Proposition 3 Suppose that p2−p1 >p 1d+(1− p2)h.17 Then for any η > 0,
there exists a δ such that for all δ ∈ (δ,1), there exists a two-state machine
private equilibrium whose payoﬀ V (δ) is larger than 1 − d
L1−1 − η.
The direct proof is found in the Appendix. Later we show how to construct
a two-state machine equilibrium for general two players stage game, and the
above Proposition will be derived as a special case (see Section 5.2.1.).
Note that this formula uses the likelihood ratio L1 ¡
>L 0¢
instead of L0
or Lq for any q ∈ (0,1), but otherwise it looks exactly like the best trigger
strategy payoﬀ. The advantage of private equilibrium comes from this larger
likelihood ratio. As a corollary to Propositions 1 and 3, we can show that the
PE Pareto-dominates the best symmetric PPE payoﬀ.
Corollary 4 Suppose that p2 − p1 >p 1d +( 1− p2)h, h > d, and 1 − d
L1−1 >
1+d−h
2 , then there exists a δ such that for all δ ∈ (δ,1), there exists a two-state
machine equilibrium which Parero-dominates the best symmetric PPE payoﬀ.18
Proof. See Appendix.
Although certain restrictions are imposed on the structure of the stage game
for this corollary, there still exists an open set of parameters which satisﬁes all
these restrictions. As an example of Corollary 4, we construct an example where
private equilibria are nearly eﬃcient, while the only PPE is the repetition of the
stage game Nash equilibrium.









where ² is a small positive number.19
It is easy to show that the assumptions for Proposition 4 is satisﬁed for small
² if κ < 1.A s ² becomes small, it becomes more diﬃcult to detect the opponent’s
deviation when (C,C) is played. The formula (6) 1−q−qh−
(1−q)d+qh
Lq−1 becomes
approximately 1−q (2 + κ)−
(1−q)κ+q(1+κ)
q = −q (2 + κ)− κ
q for small ²,w h i c h
is a negative number. This means that the trigger strategy cannot sustain
17This assumption turns out to be equivalent to VR (δ) >V P (δ), where VR (δ) and VP (δ)
are derived from the equations (13) - (16). Proposition 12 in Section 5.2.1 derives expressions
for VR (δ) and VP (δ) in a general setting, and the detailed explanation of the present example
can be found there.
18Note that the best symmetric PPE is the most eﬃcient PPE as we allow public random-
ization devices for PPE. Thus our PE (which does not use a device) is more eﬃcient than
any PPE.
19When a player is playing C, the distribution of the public signal is not so sensitive to the
other player’s action. This implies that the realized payoﬀs have to vary large to generate
the ﬁxed expected payoﬀ matrix as ² becomes small. In particular, u(C,X) →− ∞and
u(C,Y ) →∞as ² → 0.
13anything other than the repetition of (D,D). Another candidate of the upper
bound for symmetric PPE payoﬀsi ss i m p l y1+d−h
2 =0by Proposition 1. Hence
there exists a ² such that for ² ∈ (0,²) the only PPE is the repetition of the
one shot Nash equilibrium independent of discount factor. On the other hand,
the private equilibrium achieves 1 − d
L1−1 as δ → 1, which is approximately
1 − κ with small ². Since κ can be an arbitrary small positive number, we can
construct an example where the PE is approximately eﬃcient and the only PPE
is the repetition of the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
4 The Advantage of Private Equilibria with a
Large Signal Space
The preceding analysis focuses on the case with signal space, where the folk
theorem in public strategies fails. In this section we present an example to
show that even when the folk theorem holds, so that eﬃciency is asymptotically
achieved by PPE, PE may do better than any PPE for each suﬃciently high20
discount factor δ < 1. It is a version of the prisoners’ dilemma, whose expected




The public signal ω takes on three values, X, Y1,a n dY2, and the probability
distributions are given below.
XY 1 Y2
(C,C)1 /31 /31 /3
(D,C)01 /2+² 1/2 − ²
(C,D)01 /2 − ² 1/2+²
(D,D)1 /31 /31 /3
Note that, as long as ²>0, the pairwise full rank condition (PFR) is sat-
isﬁed at (C,C),t h a ti s ,t h eﬁrst three rows are linearly independent.21 This
means that each player’s defection at (C,C) is statistically discriminated (player
i’s deviation makes signal Yi more likely, i =1 ,2). So the Fudenberg-Levine-
Maskin Folk Theorem applies, and the eﬃcient payoﬀ (1,1) can be approxi-
mately achieved by a PPE as δ → 1. Also note that this model is similar to the
model in Section 2, where signal X arises only when both players take the same
action. Therefore, it is easy to check that the eﬃcient payoﬀ (1,1) can also be
approximately achieved by a PE as δ → 1 b yt h es a m es t r a t e g y(##) used in
20If δ is small, the only equilibrium is a trivial one (the repetition of the stage game equi-
librium), which is by deﬁnition a PPE. In our example, a PE does strictly better than any
PPE whenever a non-trivial equilibrium exists.
21When ² =0 ,P F Rf a i l sa ta n y( p o s s i b l ym i x e d )a c t i o np r o ﬁle, because at most two rows
in the above table are linearly independent.
14Section 3.1. In summary, both PPE and PE asymptotically achieves eﬃciency
as δ → 1 in this example. We can show, however, that the PE in Section 2 does
better than any PPE for all suﬃciently large δ < 1,i f² is small enough.
Formally, we derive the following upper bound of the best symmetric PPE
payoﬀs.
Proposition 5 For any (large) H>0, there is a (small enough) value of the








is an upper bound of the best symmetric PPE payoﬀsu n d e rδ.
Note that, when H is large, the upper bound is a steep (almost linear) curve
for δ suﬃciently close to 1 (and otherwise it is 0). The proof is given in Appendix
B. Intuitively, this bound is derived by the following observation. It turns
out that in our example positive payoﬀs cannot be sustained if we punish the
players simultaneously.H o w e v e r ,a sl o n ga s²>0, we can utilize an asymmetric
p u n i s h m e n tw h e r ew e“ t r a n s f e r ”p l a y e ri’s future payoﬀ to player j,w h e np l a y e r
i’s defection is suspected (i.e., when Yi a r i s e s ) .H e n c et os u p p o r tap a y o ﬀ proﬁle
by a PPE, we must require the future payoﬀs to vary in the northwest/southeast
directions around the payoﬀ proﬁle to be supported. As the players’ defections
become indistinguishable (² → 0), however, we need huge payoﬀ transfers to
support cooperation, and for such transfers to be in the feasible payoﬀ set, the
discount factor should be suﬃciently large. This observation provides a lower
bound of δ to support the given payoﬀ proﬁle, which in turn provides the upper
bound of the PPE payoﬀsf o re a c hδ in Proposition 5.
On the other hand, the private equilibrium in Section 3.1 relies only on the
assumption p(X|D,D) > 0=p(X|D,C)=p(X|C,D), so that it also works
in the present example, irrespective of the level of ². As in Section 2, we can
derive the equilibrium probability qi of defection for each player i by solving the
following quadratic equation in q;
(1 − δ){(h − d)q + d} = δqp(X|D,D)(1 − q − qh) (17)
Note that, in the current example, we have h =6 , d =1and p(X|DD)=1 /3.
Hence (17) becomes
f(q) ≡ 7δq2 +( 1 5− 16δ)q +3 ( 1− δ)=0
. As we are interested in the most eﬃcient equilibrium (hence the one with the
smallest q), we choose the smaller root, denoted q(δ). Computation shows that
this solution is real and lies in [0,1] when δ ≥ 0.992. The associated symmetric
private equilibrium payoﬀ for each player is v(δ)=1− 7q(δ). Figure 2 plots
this along with the upper bound of symmetric PPE payoﬀs in Proposition 5:
1 − (1−δ
δ )H, where H is set to be 500 by choosing a suitable small ².T h e
horizontal axis represents the discount factor δ. The solid curve represents the
private equilibrium payoﬀ, while the thin dotted straight line is an upper bound
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Figure 2
Hence, for each δ < 1, a PE does better than any PPE (whenever something
other than the repetition of the stage game equilibrium can be sustained).
5 Generalization
In this section, we demonstrate how to construct a two-state machine equilib-
rium in general two-person repeated games. As we generalize our construction
of private strategy equilibria, it may help to generalize two state machine as
well. An obvious way to generalize it is to incorporate more than two states.
We ﬁrst show that restricting attention to two-state machine entails no loss of
generality. In the next subsection, we introduce general machines with many
states, which share the same property with the simple two state machine in the
previous sections, and show that they can be reduced to a two state machine.
5.1 Two State Is Enough
We formally deﬁne generalized machine with many states as follows. A machine













set of player i0s states with θ
0
i being the initial state. Player i0sb e h a v i o r
strategy at the state θ
n
i is αn
i ∈ ∆i, and µnm





i when ai is played and ω is observed.
Let supp(αn
i ) be the support of αn
i . Suppose that (M1,M 2) satisﬁes the












For n =0 ,1,....,lj (18)
∀ai ∈ A∗
i,V n













16∀ai / ∈ A∗
i,V n


















This is clearly a straightforward generalization of the equations (13)-(16). This
machine is basically a many-state analogue of the two state machine in previous
sections.
Consider any sequential equilibrium which consists of a pair of machines
with many states, which satisﬁes the above equations. We can show that there
exists a sequential equilibrium with a two state machine which achieves the
same equilibrium payoﬀ.22
Proposition 6 If a pair of machines (M1,M 2) with many states (2 ≤ l1,l 2 ≤∞ )
satisﬁes (18), there exists a pair of two state machines which constitute a se-


















The intuition of the proof is very simple. Player i0s state θ
n
i determines
player j0s continuation payoﬀ completely. If the number of player i0s states is
ﬁnite, then there exists player i0ss t a t eθi which maximizes player j0s continua-
tion payoﬀ and θi which minimizes player j0s continuation payoﬀ.T h e n p l a y e r i
can always generate player j’s payoﬀ at any other state θ
n
i by randomly moving
to θi and θi when she is supposed to move to θ
n
i . Hence she needs only two states
to generate any payoﬀ of player j associated with all states. When the number
of the states is not ﬁn i t e ,w em a yn o tb ea b l et oﬁnd such θi and θi. However, we
can still ﬁnd a sequence of the states (and mixed actions associated with them)
to approximate V 00











,a n dw e










i,j =1 ,2, by choosing a convergent subsequence.












can be supported by using the two state machine we constructed. For example,
if player i chooses V 00
j and V 01
j with probability (1 − λi,λi) in the ﬁrst period,
this is still a sequential equilibrium and player j’s expected average payoﬀ is
(1 − λi)V 00
j + λiV 01
j ,j6= i.
22Recall that Piccione [16] used such a machine with countable states in the context of
repeated games with private monitoring, and Ely and Valimaki [3] succeeded to simplify it
to a two state machine. The following result provides an algorithm to reduce the number of
states to two in more general settings.
175.2 General Two State Machine
Now we can focus on two state machines. We use R and P to denote “reward”
and “punishment” states as in Section 3.2. Let AZ
i denote the support of the
equilibrium mixed action αZ
i for state Z = R,P. We are going to show that
the equilibrium condition ((18) for the two-state case) can be simpliﬁed in two
ways. The ﬁrst characterization result shows that the equilibrium condition is
equivalent to the following simpler system of linear inequalities:
(LI) For i,j =1 ,2 and j 6= i,t h e r ee x i s txR
i : Ω × AR
j → [0,∞) and
xP
i : Ω × AP




j ) − E[xR
i (ω,a j)|ai,αR
j ] (19)
∀ai / ∈ A∗
i V R
i = gi(ai,αR























Proposition 8 (Linear Inequalities Characterization) If there is a two-
state machine equilibrium which satisﬁes the equilibrium condition (18), then
(LI) is satisﬁed. Conversely, if (LI) holds, then there is a two-state machine





provided that discount factor δ is close enough to unity.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Intuitively, xR
i and xP
i in (LI) represent
t h ef u t u r ep a y o ﬀ variations in each state of a two-state machine. Condition
(LI) reveals that there is a certain restriction on the actions that can be used
in a two-state machine:
Proposition 9 The (potentially mixed) actions used in a two-state machine
equilibrium αR
i and αP
i , and their support A∗
i =supp(αR
i )∪supp(αR










Proof. Condition (19) and the non-negativity of xR
i implies gi(ai,αR
j ) ≥ V R
for all ai ∈ A∗
i. In contrast, (21), (22), and the non-negativity of xP
i shows
V P ≥ gi(ai,αP
j ) for all ai ∈ Ai. The corollary follows from V R
i >VP
i .
The separation condition is necessary for a two-state machine equilibrium,
b u ti ti sa l s os u ﬃcient under good observability. To state formally what “good
18observability” means, let us introduce some more notations ﬁrst. Let gi(a,αR
j )
be the vector of player’s i0s expected payoﬀsg i v e nαR
j .L e t P (aj) be a pos-





and deﬁne, for any
A0

















































for Z = R,P. Then, (19)-(22) can be compactly ex-
pressed as
gi(a,αR
j ) − V R










j ) − V P










0 ∈ <|Ai| and hZ
i ≥ 0 denotes non-negative slack variables,
w h i c hc o r r e s p o n dt ot h ed i ﬀerence between the left and right hand sides of
incentive constraints in (LI) (hence hk
i is 0 if the corresponding action proﬁle ak
i
is in A∗
i). Geometrically, this means that the left hand side is contained in the


























These equations (26) imply that a more informative signalling structure (in
the sense of Blackwell) leads to a better two state machine. Let e w0 and e w be a
random public signal and assume that e w0 is a garbling of e w. Then the following
result is immediately obtained.
Proposition 10 If e w0 is a (strict) garbling of e w in the sense of Blackwell,





















Proof. Let p0 and p be density functions for e w0 and e w respectively. Then
there exist density functions q (·|ω0) on Ω for each ω0 ∈ Ω and p0 (ω|a)= P
ω0 q (ω|ω0)p(ω0|a). This implies that cone(P0 (A∗
i)) ∈ cone(P (A∗
i)).T h e r e -










isﬁes (26) with p0,t h e r ee x i s t sxZ
i (A∗







Next suppose that e w0 is a strict garbling of e w, that is, q (·|ω0) > 0 for all
ω0 ∈ Ω. Then, cone(P0 (A∗
i))/{0} is in the relative interior of cone(P (A∗
i)).
Note that I is also in the relative interior of cone(P (A∗










which satisﬁes (26) with

























if and only if there exists some aj ∈ A∗
j and
ω ∈ Ω for which p(ω|a) is not constant for all ai ∈ Ai. Note that this cannot happen when
there exists a two state machine equilibrium for p0 because then the separation condition is
violated.
19gi(a,α0P
j ) − V 0P





























The proof of this proposition suggests that a two state machine can be
constructed more easily if a cone associated with the signalling structure is
larger.24 Clearly, the upper bound of all such cones is R
|Ai|
+ . We can show
that if P (Aj) is close enough to R
|Ai|
+ (this is what “under good observability”
means), then the separation condition (25) is suﬃcient for the construction of
a two state machine with (αR
i ,αP
i ),i=1 ,2.
Proposition 11 Suppose that (αR
i ,αP
i ), i =1 ,2 satisfy the separation condi-
tion (25). Then a proﬁle of the two-state machine equilibrium with those actions
can be constructed if cone(P (Ai)) is close enough to R
|Ai|
+ for Z = R,P and
i =1 ,2.
Proof. See Appendix.
One example of monitoring structure to satisfy the above assumption is as
follows. Suppose that, when player j mixes actions over A0
j ⊂ Aj, the opponent
i’s action is perfectly detected with a positive probability, that is,
∀a0
i ∈ Ai ∃(ω0,a 0
j) ∈ (Ω × A0
j) such that p(ω0|ai,a 0
j)
½
> 0 if ai = a0
i
=0 otherwise .





Note that this means that there is a combination of ω0 and a0
j to detect given
action a0
i. The advantage of private equilibrium is its ability to mix such
detecting action (a0
j) and to punish the opponent only when the detecting action
is taken. Also note that, for each action of the opponent we may have a diﬀerent
detecting action.
We now present a second characterization of the two-state machine equilib-
ria, which is a generalization of the closed form formula of an equilibrium payoﬀ
with relevant likelihood ratio (equation (3) in Section 3). To this end, let us








24Indeed what we need for Proposition 10 is simply that the cone associated with e w (strictly)
contains the cone associated with e w0 .T h a t e w0 is a garbling of e w is just a simple suﬃcient
condition for this more general condition.
20and deﬁne the deviation gain from this benchmark by
dZ
i (ai)=gi(ai,αZ
j ) − gi(aZ
i ,αZ
j ). (29)
The choice of benchmark is somewhat arbitrary, and for any choice satisfying
(27) we have the following equivalence (Theorem 12). The theorem holds under
the following ”full support” assumption:
The full support assumption: ∀(ω,a) p(ω|a) > 0.
Proposition 12 (Likelihood Ratio Representation) Under the full support
assumption, (LI) is satisﬁed with xR
i and xP
i which are not identically equal to
zero, if and only if the following set of conditions holds:
(LR) For each player i =1 ,2 and each state for Z = R,P, there exist a weight
function β
Z
i : Ω × AZ




i (ω,a j)=1 ) and slack vari-
ables hZ













i (ai)=1 if and only if dZ
i (ai)+hZ








i (ai) − 1
if dZ
i (ai)+hZ
i (ai) 6=0 , (31)
∀ai ∈ A∗
i hZ








Remark 13 In the above statement, the slack variable hZ
i (ai) is equal to zero












21T h ep r o o fi sf o u n di nt h eA p p e n d i x ,a n dh e r ew eo ﬀer interpretations of those
conditions. First, we consider state S = R. The remark shows that deviation
to ai increases the expected penalty by the factor of LR
i (ai), and Proposition 12
shows that LR






i (ai)−1 represents the welfare loss associated with the
penalty scheme xR
i (ω,a j). Note that condition gR
i >V R
i ensures that this
welfare loss is positive. The merit of (LR) is to provide an explicit expression
for the welfare loss in a simple form: It is proportional to the gain from devia-
tion (plus the slack variable) and decreasing in the degree of observability (the
likelihood ratio LR
i (ai) in the denominator).








i (ai)−1 > 0, so that the condition (31) may

















i (ai) represents the expected bonus to satisfy in-
centive constraints. Note that we have bonus instead of ﬁn e ,a si n c e n t i v e si n
state P are controlled by changing the probability of going to the better state
R.N o t e a l s o t h a t LP
i (ai) can be interpreted as the likelihood ratio associated
with the bonus scheme xP
i (ω,a j).
We can state the analysis of example in Section 3.2 as a special case of this
general theorem. In the example, we have, for i =1 ,2,
A∗
i = AR




i = C,a n daP
i = D,






We could interpret that the penalty scheme xR
























i (ai) is the likelihood ratio of getting the ﬁxed penalty xR
i .I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e
probability of getting the ﬁxed ﬁne xR
i is increased by this factor if player i deviates from the
benchmark action aR


































Note that we have (i) (gR
i ,d R
i (D)) → (1,d) as αR




j (D)=1 . Therefore, the above condition (33) is satisﬁed for
αR











which is equivalent to our condition p2 −p1 >p 1d+(1−p2)h in Proposition 3.
6 Related Literature and Comments
Private Monitoring
The private monitoring model is obtained by replacing the public signal ω
with privately observed signals ωi, i =1 ,2, whose joint distribution is given by
p(ω1,ω2|a). We claim that the private strategies we constructed also work under
private monitoring. Consider the general many-state machine equilibrium in
Section 5.1. If we replace ω in the dynamic programming condition (18) with
ωi, it provides an equilibrium in the private monitoring case. This condition
(18) shows that each player has an incentive to follow equilibrium actions, no
matter which state the opponent is in. Call this many-state machine equilibrium
in the private monitoring case. Then, the following results are obtained in the
private monitoring case, just by replacing ω with ωi in our proofs.
1. The equilibrium payoﬀs achieved by a many-state machine equilibrium
can also be achieved with a two-state machine (Proposition 6, where ω is
replaced with ωi).
2. Any two-state machine can be characterized by a system of linear inequal-
ities (Proposition 8, where ω is replaced with ωi).
3. Any two-state machine equilibrium payoﬀ admits the likelihood represen-
tation (Proposition 12, where ω is replaced with ωi).
23One interesting point to note is that our equilibrium has certain continuity
properties on the boundary between the private and public monitoring struc-
tures30. Suppose, for example, that players observe a public signal perturbed
by independent private noise. This game falls in the class of repeated games
with private monitoring. Since each player does not need to know the other
player’s state, it is not important whether a player can observe her opponent’s
signals. Thus our private equilibrium can also be an equilibrium for repeated
games with private monitoring.
Ely and Välimäki [3] independently31 found a similar two-state machine
strategy in the framework of repeated games with private monitoring. As in this
paper, a player is indiﬀerent among all the repeated game strategies regardless
of the state the opponent is in. The idea behind these strategies goes back
to Piccione [16], where the equilibrium strategy is basically a machine with a
countably inﬁnite number of states.
However, there is a critical diﬀerence between our paper and Ely and Välimäki
[3]. In Ely and Välimäki, a player plays a pure action at each state. In con-
trast, we consider mixed actions because it is crucial for our result that a player
does not know which action the opponent is choosing. If a player knows the
opponent’s action, she is more tempted to defect when C is being played and
more likely to cooperate when the “monitoring” action D is being played. Since
players need to use the action-signal pair without being noticed for the eﬃcient
punishment, they need to play a mixed action at the reward state in our pa-
per. Indeed, Ely and Välimäki’s two-state machine, which uses a pure action
in each state, can sometimes be strictly improved by using a mixed action at
each state. The eﬃcient use of the signaling structure is the key to our eﬃcient
private equilibria. This idea of eﬃcient monitoring is not new. It is an old and
simple idea which lies at the heart of any moral hazard model. One contribution
of this paper is to ﬁnd a way to use this idea to its full extent in the context of
repeated games/dynamic moral hazard models.
Private Strategy
Recently, Mailath, Matthews, and Sekiguchi [12] found examples of ﬁnitely
repeated games with public monitoring for which there exists a PE which is
better than any PPE. Lehrer [11] used a private strategy as an endogenous
correlation device in repeated games without discounting. Kandori [8] shows
that FLM’s suﬃcient condition for the folk theorem can be relaxed when play-
ers can communicate. It is based on a certain type of private strategies where
players randomize over their actions and announce their realizations. Obara
30Mailath and Morris [13] provided some conditions under which a particular PPE remains
a sequential equilibrium with almost public monitoring when a public signal structure is
perturbed slightly with private noise. Their conditions require players to have almost common
knowledge about the other players’ continuation strategies at all times. Note that our PE does
not satisfy this suﬃcient condition. On the contrary, its property is rather orthogonal to this
requirement; players do not have to have any knowledge about the opponent’s continuation
strategy at any point.
31Simultaneously with the original version of this paper (Obara [14]) .
24[15] applies a similar idea in the context of mechanism design. Kandori and
Obara [9] considers repeated games where players may choose to pay some costs
to obtain additional (private) information about the other players’ actions. We
examine the scope and limitations of the equilibria where (i) each player ran-
domizes between monitoring and nonmonitoring, and (ii) each player’s continu-
ation strategy depends on whether she monitored or not. This is similar to the
private strategy in this paper in the sense that players’ continuation strategies
depend on realizations of their mixed actions, although the signals are private,
not public.
Robustness
There are a couple of comments on the robustness of the private equilib-
ria. First, when the parameters such as (d,h,p(X|CC),p(X|CD),p(X|DD))
change slightly, there exists a PE close to the original PE. This is due to
the regularity of equations characterizing the parameters of two-state machines.
Secondly, suppose that each player can observe additional signals which are
informative about the other player’s state. Our PE still continues to be a se-
quential equilibrium in this setting because a player does not have to know the
other player’s state.
Open Issue
Finally, there is one important open question left unanswered. Although
we were able to show that a PE can be far more eﬃcient than any PPE, we
have not characterized the best private equilibrium payoﬀ yet. This is due to
the lack of recursive structure of private monitoring equilibria, which makes the
characterization of all private equilibria quite diﬃcult (see Kandori [7]). In
general, when PPE payoﬀsa r ei n e ﬃcient, is there also an eﬃciency bound for
private equilibria? Or, do private equilibria achieve full eﬃciency? This is left
as an important topic for future research.
25Appendix A: proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1.
Proof. Let us ﬁr s tp r o v eau s e f u ll e m m aw h i c hg e n e r a l l yh o l d sf o rt h eb e s t
symmetric PPE payoﬀ (which may be based on asymmetric strategies and public
correlation device).
Lemma 14 Let (v∗,v∗) b et h eb e s ts y m m e t r i cP P Ep a y o ﬀ for a repeated game
with symmetric stage game payoﬀs. Then there exists a PPE which achieves
t h es a m et o t a lp a y o ﬀ 2v∗ and do not use any public correlation device in the
initial period. Furthermore, the sum of the expected stage payoﬀs in the initial
period is no less than 2v∗.32
Proof. When the best symmetric PPE payoﬀ is achieved by public ran-
domization over some PPE, each of them must obtain the same total payoﬀ 2v∗
(otherwise, we can just pick up (v1,v 2) with the highest total payoﬀ and achieve
a higher symmetric payoﬀ by equally randomizing over (v1,v 2) and (v2,v 1),a
contradiction). Pick up any one of those PPE. By deﬁnition, it does not use any
public randomization in the ﬁrst period, and therefore it is achieved by a current
(possibly mixed) action proﬁle α and continuation payoﬀs (V1(ω),V 2(ω)) such
that
2v∗ =( 1− δ)(g1(α)+g2(α)) + δE [V1(ω)+V2(ω)|α],
where gi is player i’s payoﬀ function and E [·| α] is the expectation under α.
For the second part, note that, if g1(α)+g2(α) < 2v∗, the sum of the
expected continuation payoﬀsw o u l db e
E [V1(ω)+V2(ω)|α] > 2v∗
This contradicts our assumption that (v∗,v∗) is the best symmetric PPE payoﬀ
proﬁle. Hence g1(α)+g2(α) ≥ 2v∗.¥
We continue the proof of Proposition 1. Let vs (> 0) be the best symmetric
PPE payoﬀ in the repeated partnership game. Lemma 14 implies that (i) there
exists a PPE payoﬀ proﬁle (v1,v2) such that 2vs = v1 + v2, (ii) players do not





mixed action proﬁle in the ﬁrst period of such PPE.
First, note that Lemma 14 provides an obvious upper bound on 2vs (i) if
αq =( D,D), then g1(D,D)+g2(D,D)=0is an upper bound, (ii) if q ∈ Q,





then 1+g − l ≥ g1(αq)+g2(αq) is an upper bound.
Suppose otherwise, that is, both players are playing C with positive proba-
bility and q/ ∈ Q. Then the following two inequalities hold for i =1 ,2.:
























32Note that the space of public signal can be arbitrary. We use this lemma later when we
analyze a partenrship game with three public signals.
26where ω0(q)=Ω/{ω(q)}. Note that Vi (ω0(q)) ≥ Vi (ω(q)). Replace Vi (ω0(q))−
Vi (ω(q)) by ρiVi (ω0(q)) (ρi ∈ [0,1]) so that the second inequality holds as an
equality. Then we obtain
vi ≤ (1 − δ)gi(C,α
q
j)+δ(Vi (ω0(q)) − p(ω(q)|C,αq)ρiVi (ω0(q))) (34)
vi =( 1 − δ)gi(D,α
q











j). Combining this with (34), we obtain





















1 (ω(q)) + V 0
2 (ω(q)) 5 2vs, the following inequality is obtained by














P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Proof. To show the eﬃciency of the private equilibrium given above, we
need to prove that a root of equation (11) lies in (0,1) and tends to unity as δ
tends to 1.A tq =0 , the left hand side of (11) is strictly positive but the right
hand side is equal to zero. Now let q be any number q0 ∈ (0, 1
1+h) and let δ
tends to 1. The left hand side of (11) tends to zero, while the right hand side
tends to
q0p(X|D,D){1 − q0 (1 + h)} > 0
Thus equation (11) has a solution in (0,q0) as δ tends to 1,w h e r eq0 is any
number close to 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Proof. From (13) and (14), we can obtain
(1 − δ){(1 − qR)d + qRh} = δqRρR (p2 − p1)(VR − VP) (35)
As before, we can use this equation to derive the following equation from (13)
VR =1− qR − qRh −
(1 − qR)d + qRh
L1 − 1
(36)
27Similarly, we can derive the following two equations from (15) - (16).
VP =1− qP − qPh +





(1 − δ){(1 − qP)d + qPh} = δqPρP (p2 − p1)(VR − VP) (38)
This system of equations is equivalent to (13)-(16).
First note that ρR should be set equal to 1. If there exists a solution of
these equations with ρR < 1, then you can reduce qR and raise ρR to increase
VR via (36) while (35) is maintained, and reduce ρP so that (38) is still satisﬁed.
In this way, we can obtain another solution with higher equilibrium payoﬀ VR.
Second, qP can be also set equal to 1. If not, you can increase qP to reduce
VP via (37), while lowering ρR and ρP so that (35) and (38) is satisﬁed. This
leads to VP =
(1−p2)h
p2−p1 from (37).
Now we are left with three equations (35), (36), (38) and three unknowns
(qR,ρP,V R). Once qR is obtained, VR is also obtained from (36) and ρP =
qRh
(1−qR)d+qRh ∈ [0,1] is obtained from (35) and (38). Thus we only need to ﬁnd
qR in [0,1].
These three equations reduce to a quadratic equation for qR;
c2 (δ)q2
R + c1 (δ)qR + c0 (δ)=0
where
c2 (δ)=δ {p2 (1 + h) − p1 (1 + d)}
c1 (δ)=( 1 − δ)(h − d)+δ{p1d +( 1− p2)h − (p2 − p1)}
c0 (δ)=( 1 − δ)d
One root of this quadratic equation is clearly qR =0when δ =1 .S i n c e
∂F
∂qR|(qR,δ)=(0,1) 6=0by the assumption p2 − p1 >p 1d +( 1− p2)h, the implicit









p1d+(1−p2)h−(p2−p1), which is negative by
assumption. Thus there exists a qR (δ) ∈ (0,1) for large enough δ such that
qR (δ) → 0 as δ → 1. Hence we get a solution for (35) - (38) parameterized by
δ around δ =1 .
Clearly this two state machine generates a sequential equilibrium combined
with the belief obtained via Bayes’ rule.33 Since the equilibrium payoﬀ VR (δ)
converges to 1 − d
L1−1 as δ → 1, for any η > 0 we can ﬁnd δ such that the
equilibrium payoﬀ exceeds 1 − α
L1−1 − η for any δ ∈ (δ,1).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
33Belief can be simply derived by Bayes rule at any history. Since any deviation is not
observable to the opponent, a player always updates her belief assuming that the opponent
has never deviated.






by Proposition 1. First, 1 − d









Secondly, 1 − d
L1−1 > 1+d−h
2 is just assumed. Finally, it is easy to see that
vq =1− q − qh −
(1−q)d+qh








= 1 − q − qh−
(1 − q)d + qh
Lq − 1
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that both M1 and M2 has only a ﬁnite number of
states. Then there exists player 2’s state which corresponds to the largest V n
1 .
Suppose without loss of generality that n =0 . Similarly, let n =1be the
state which minimizes the value function of player 1. We modify player 20s
















2 is deﬁned by V n







Then, we obtain the following system of (in)equalities;
For n =0 ,1,
∀a1 ∈ A∗
1,V n














∀a1 / ∈ A∗
1,V n

































29This deﬁnes a two state machine for player 2. We can repeat the same procedure






n=0 , αi,µ 0
i
o
,i=1 ,2 clearly satisﬁes (18), hence constitute a sequential














If the number of the states is countable, we might not able to ﬁnd the
best state and the worst state. In such a case, we construct them in the fol-




n=0 is bounded by assumption, there exists V 00
1 =s u p n=0,...,l2 {V n
1 } and
V 01
1 =i n f n=0,...,l2 {V n
1 } such that −∞ <V 01
1 ≤ V 00





1 )a n dαn







spectively), for n =0 ,1, we can ﬁnd a subsequence θ
n(k)
2, ,k =1 ,2,.... such
that V
n(k)









1 → e V n
1 (a2,ω) as
k →∞ . Then, V 0n
1 ,α0n
2 and e V n
1 (a2,ω) satisfy
For n =0 ,1,
∀a1 ∈ A∗
1,V 0n








2 (a2)p(ω|a1,a 2) e V n
1 (a2,ω)
∀a1 / ∈ A∗
1,V 0n








2 (a2)p(ω|a1,a 2) e V n
1 (a2,ω)



















1 and V 01
1 . We can construct a two state machine M1 in a similar way and







P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
Proof. Consider the following transition rule for player j in the two-state
machine (or Markov) strategy: go to state P with probability ρz
j(ω,a j) when
the current state (for j)i sz = R,P and the current signal and j’s action are ω
and aj ( o t h e r w i s e ,g ot os t a t eR). Consider the dynamic programming equation
for the average payoﬀ for player i when j is in state z = R.P,
V z







where the equality should be satisﬁed for ai ∈ suppαR
i ∪suppαP
i .C o n s i d e r ﬁrst
the case z = R. Subtracting δV R
i from both sides and dividing through by
30(1 − δ),w eo b t a i n
V R
i ≥ gi(ai,αR




j (ω,a j)(V R
i − V P
i )|ai,αR
j ],
where equality holds for ai ∈suppαR
i ∪suppαP
i . A similar manipulation for state







j (ω,a j))(V R
i − V P
i )|ai,αP
j ],
where equality holds for ai ∈ suppαR
i ∪suppαP
i . Hence, if we have an equilibrium






j (ω,a j)(V R
i − V P






j (ω,a j))(V R
i − V P
i ). (41)
Conversely, suppose that conditions (19)−(23) are satisﬁed. Then, (40) and (41)
can be satisﬁed for ρz
j(ω,a j) ∈ [0,1], z = R,P,f o rs u ﬃciently high δ. Hence
we obtain the equilibrium condition (39) and the two-state machine equilibrium
to support payoﬀs (V R
i ,VP
i ) for i =1 ,2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 1






which satisﬁes (19)−(22) can be easily












to satisfy (26) for any V R
i and hR
i .






is positive, we can choose a large enough numbers






















 ≥ 0 and
for i =1 ,2,a n dd e ﬁne
b V R
i ≡ V R
i − Ki






≥ 0 and b V R
i for i =1 ,2 to satisfy (26). The
same argument applies to conditions (21) and (22).
Next we need to show that V R
i and V P
i can be constructed so that the










+ for i 6= j)34, V R







34Although what we mean by “close” is obvious, formally we need a metric to deﬁne closeness
of two cones, say. One example of such distances between two cones E and F ∈ <n
+ would
be
kE ∩ B1 (0) − F ∩ B1 (0)k
where k·k is Hausdorﬀ distance and B1 (0) is an open ball around 0 with radius 1.
31hR








+ as it should be maximized to satisfy
(26)(see Figure 3 below). Since we can make the slack positive variables hR
i
as large as possible for any ai / ∈ A∗







can be negative). On the other hand, we need to make V P
i as small as possible
so that (23) is satisﬁed. Hence V P













i − εI ⊂− <
|Ai|
+ . Since hP
i can be set to 0
without loss of generality to minimize V P






So, the feasibility condition (25) can be satisﬁed for some V R

















when information is almost perfect. This is exactly the condition (25).














P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2
Proof. The proof is given in two steps. First, we show that (LI) is equivalent
to the following condition:
(LR’) Conditions in (LR) are satisﬁed, except that LZ





















i : Ω × AZ
j → [0,1] that is not identically equal to zero.
Theorem 12 is then obtained by this equivalence and the following lemma:
Lemma 15 Condition (42) is satisﬁed for some λ
Z
i : Ω × AZ
j → [0,1] that is














i : Ω × AZ




i (ω,a j)=1 .
P r o o fo f( L I ) ⇐⇒(LR’):
( P a r tI )W es h o wt h a t( L I )i m p l i e s( L R ’ ) . L e tu sa s s u m et h a t( L I )i ss a t i s ﬁed,




i (ω,a j) for Z = R
xP






i (ω,a j) for Z = R
max(ω,aj) xP
i (ω,a j) for Z = P .
and also deﬁne λ
Z
i : Ω × AZ
j → [0,1] that is not identically equal to zero by
λ
Z






We can interpret that xZ
i (ω,a j) eﬀectively imposes ﬁxed ﬁne TR
i < 0 (for Z = R)
or bonus TP
i > 0 (for Z = P) with probability λ
Z
i (ω,a j),w h e n(ω,a j) is realized.
The probability of getting the ﬁxed ﬁne or bonus T Z







i (ω,a j)p(ω|ai,a j)αZ
j (aj). (45)
This is always strictly positive, because of the full support assumption and the
fact that λ
Z
























Let us recall that the following four crucial conditions are satisﬁed
∀ai pZ








i < 0, and (49)
TP
i > 0. (50)
Those conditions directly shows V R
i <g R
i and V P
i >g P




i (ai) by deﬁnition, we have the following equivalence when-

























































so that (42) is satisﬁed. As (LI) requires V R
i >VP
i , all conditions in (LR’) are
satisﬁed.
(Part II) We now show (LR’)⇒(LI). Suppose (LR’) holds. First deﬁne
pZ
i (ai) by (45). As λ
Z
i is not identically equal to zero, pZ
i (ai) > 0 for all
ai (condition (47)) holds. Let us now choose a number TZ
i to satisfy V Z
i =
35Because TZ
i 6=0by (49) and (50).
36By (47), LZ
i (ai) is well-deﬁned. The formula for V Z






























i (condition (48)). As we have V R
i <g R
i and V P
i >g P
i ,w eh a v e
T R
i < 0 and TP
i > 0. Hence, conditions (49) and (50) are satisﬁed. Since (i)








i ) by (42), we can follow the equivalence relations in Part I to
reach equality (46). Now deﬁne xZ


















i . Plugging this into the obtained equality
(46), we can show that the incentive constraints in (LI) are satisﬁed. ¥.
Note that, the slack variables hZ
i satisfy the requirement in the ”Further-



















Now we turn to Lemma 15.



















































1 by deﬁnition and we obtain (43).






























where K>0 is a suﬃciently small number to ensure λ
Z










































Appendix B: Example 2
Let qi be the probability that player i chooses action D.G i v e n qj,t h e
probability of X when player i chooses C and D are respectively 1
3(1 −qj) and
1
3qj,a sX arises only when both players take the same action. Hence we have
the following simple but useful observation.
Lemma 16 When player i deviates from C to D while the opponent chooses D
with probability qj,o u t c o m eX becomes less likely iﬀ qj < 1/2.
Let F be the sum of the expected stage payoﬀs under (q1,q 2),
F =( 1 + 1 ) ( 1 − q1)(1 − q2)+( 2− 6)q1(1 − q2)+( 2− 6)(1 − q1)q2
=2 − 6q2 − 6q1 +1 0 q1q2.
We note that this is positive only if both players choose D with suﬃciently low
probability.
Lemma 17 T h es u mo ft h es t a g ep a y o ﬀs is positive only if q1,q 2 < 1/3.
Proof. Note that F(q1,q 2) is linear in q1 and that both F(0,q 2)=2− 6q2
and F(1,q 2)=4 ( q2 − 1) are non-positive if q2 ≥ 1/3. Hence F(q1,q 2),w h i c h
is a convex combination of those values, is non-positive if q2 ≥ 1/3. Symmetric
argument shows that F is non-positive if q1 ≥ 1/3. Hence F is positive only if
q1,q 2 < 1/3.
The following is a immediate corollary from the above two lemmata.
Corollary 18 When the sum of the stage game payoﬀsi sp o s i t i v e ,o u t c o m eX
becomes less likely if player i defects given player j’s mixed action.
Combining Lemma 17 and Corollary 18 with Lemma 14, we have:
Proposition 19 For any parameter of information structure ² ∈ [0,1/2),i ft h e
best symmetric PPE payoﬀ v∗ is not 0, then there is a (possibly asymmetric)
PPE with the same total payoﬀ 2v∗,w h e r ei nt h eﬁrst period (i) no public
correlation device is used,(ii) each player chooses D with probability less than
1/3, and (iii) unilateral defection of each player makes outcome X less likely.
Now we use this fact to show the following.
Proposition 20 T h eb e s ts y m m e t r i cP P Ep a y o ﬀ is 0 for all δ ∈ [0,1) when the
parameter of the information structure ² is equal to 0.
36Proof. Suppose v∗ > 0 and choose the equilibrium stated in the above
Proposition. When ² =0 , we can regard Y1 and Y2 as a single outcome Y .
Note that as D is dominant in the stage game, a player always has a short-
term incentive to defect, irrespective of the opponent’s mixing probability qj.
Then the above Proposition shows that both payers must be punished when





(1 − qj)Pr(Y |D,C)+qj Pr(Y |D,D)









, and by a similar argument to the proof of Proposition 3, we have
2v∗ ≤
µ















Note that 1 − 7qj is the stage payoﬀ when player i plays C and player j is
choosing D with probability qj,a n d(1 − qj) ×1+qj ×6=1+5 qj is player i’s
current gain from defection in the same situation. As L
qj
i ≤ 2/3 for qj ≤ 1/2,
we have









=1− 2 < 0 for i,j =1 ,2 and j 6= i.
which, together with (51), contradicts our presumption v∗ > 0. Hence we
conclude that best symmetric equilibrium payoﬀ is 0 when ² =0 .
Next we derive an upper bound the symmetric PPE payoﬀs. Let v∗(δ) be the
best symmetric PPE payoﬀ under δ. We suppress δ when no confusion ensues.
If v∗ is positive, the Proposition 19 shows that there is a PPE achieving the
same total payoﬀ 2v∗, where a possibly mixed action is chosen (but no public
correlation device is used) in the ﬁrst period. Let qi be the probability that
player i chooses action D in the ﬁrst period (i =1 ,2). The average payoﬀ proﬁle
of such an equilibrium, denoted (v0
1,v0




2 =2 v∗ (52)
v0
i =( 1− δ)(1 − 7qj)+δ
X
ω
vi(ω)p(ω|C,qj),f o ri,j =1 ,2 and j 6= i (53)
v0
i =( 1− δ)(2 − 2qj)+δ
X
ω
vi(ω)p(ω|D,qj),f o ri,j =1 ,2 and j 6= i (54)
In the above expression p(ω|a,q) denotes the probability of ω when a player
chooses action a (a = C,D) and the opponent chooses D with probability q
(note the symmetry of p(ω|·,·)). The continuation payoﬀ proﬁle is represented
by (v1(ω),v 2(ω)). Equations (53) and (54) respectively represent player i’s
payoﬀ when she plays C or D in the ﬁrst period. Together they imply that
player i is indiﬀerent between C and D.
37By summing up (1 − qi)×(53)+qi×(54) for i =1 ,2 and using (52), we can
calculate the total payoﬀ associated with the mixed strategy proﬁle as




Note that the ﬁrst term is (1−δ) times the sum of expected stage payoﬀs, which
we formerly deﬁned as F.A l s on o t et h a tp(ω|q1,q 2) is the probability of ω when
players mix D with probabilities q1 and q2. Subtract 2δv∗ =2 δ(v0
1 + v0
2) from
both sides and divide by (1 − δ) to obtain




where (∆1(ω),∆2(ω)) represents total (as opposed to average) future payoﬀ







i),f o ri =1 ,2. (56)
Note that the future payoﬀ variations (∆1(ω),∆2(ω)) have to satisfy some
conditions. First, it must provide right incentive for each player. Subtracting





∆i(ω)[p(ω|C,qj) − p(ω|D,qj)],f o ri,j =1 ,2 and j 6= i. (57)
Note that the left hand side is the short term gain from defection, while the
right hand side shows the reduction of the future payoﬀs. Secondly, the future
payoﬀs (v1(ω),v 2(ω)) should be chosen from the set of PPE payoﬀs V PPE(δ).






2) ∈ V PPE(δ) (58)
Let us now summarize what we have found.
Lemma 21 Let v∗ be the best symmetric PPE payoﬀ under discount factor δ.
Then, there exist q1,q 2 ∈ [0,1/2) and (∆1(ω),∆2(ω)) that satisfy the dynamic
programming value equation (55), the incentive constraint (57) and the PPE
condition (58) for some feasible payoﬀ proﬁle (v0
1,v0
2) such that v0
1 + v0
2 =2 v∗.
To get an upper bound for v∗, we will relax condition (58). First, let V F be
t h ef e a s i b l ep a y o ﬀ set, that is, the convex hull of stage payoﬀs
V F = Co{(1,1),(2,−6),(−6,2),(0,0)}.
Note that V PPE(δ) ⊂ V F.A s 2v∗ is the maximized sum of the two players’






2) ⊂ V F ∩ {v | v1 + v2 ≤ 2v∗}. (59)
38The part of the eﬃcient frontier connecting two payoﬀ proﬁles (1,1) and (2,−6)
is given by
7v1 + v2 =8 ,
and by symmetry
v1 +7 v2 =8
is the other part of the eﬃcient frontier connecting (1,1) and (−6,−2). Hence







2) ⊂ {v | v1+v2 ≤ 2v∗, 7v1+v2 ≤ 8, v1+7v2 ≤ 8}.
(60)
Let us now derive an upper bound of symmetric PPE payoﬀs. To this end,
we ﬁrst ﬁnd a lower bound of discount factor to support a symmetric payoﬀ
v∗ ∈ (0,1).F i xa n yv∗ ∈ (0,1). Lemma 21 shows that there is a feasible payoﬀ
proﬁle (v0
1,v0
2) such that v0
1 + v0
2 =2 v∗. Then, condition (60) implies (by the
ﬁrst inequality on the right hand side) 1−δ
δ (∆1(ω)+∆2(ω)) + v0
1 + v0
2 ≤ 2v∗,
which is equivalent to
∀ω ∆1(ω)+∆2(ω) ≤ 0. (61)
Also the value equation (55) and Lemma 21 show




As (2 − 6q2 − 6q1 +1 0 q1q2) is the sum of stage payoﬀs, it is less than or equal





Let r be the minimum probability of outcome X when players choose D with
probabilities q1,q 2 ∈ [0,1/2]: r =m i n q1,q2 p(X|q1,q 2) subject to q1,q 2 ∈ [0,1/2].
Note that p(X|q1,q 2) <p (Yi|q1,q 2),i=1 ,2 independent of ²>0. Clearly,
r>0, and (61) and the deﬁnition of r implies
P
ω(∆1(ω)+∆2(ω))p(ω|q1,q 2) ≤
rminω (∆1(ω)+∆2(ω)). Hence the condition (62) implies
−2 ≤ rminω (∆1(ω)+∆2(ω)). Thus we have another condition for (∆1(ω),∆2(ω));
∀ω − 2/r ≤ ∆1(ω)+∆2(ω). (63)
Now we present a crucial observation that we need large payoﬀ variations of
(∆1(ω),∆2(ω)) in the northwest/southeast directions as ² → 0.T h a ti s ,a sw e
approach the information structure where the pairwise full rank condition fails,
we need large payoﬀ transfers between the players to support a positive payoﬀ
v∗.
Lemma 22 For any (large) K>0, there is (small) ²>0 such that for each
q1,q 2 ∈ [0,1/2],i f(∆1(·),∆2(·)) satisﬁes conditions (57), (61) and (62), then
∀ω ∆1(ω),∆2(ω) ≤ K cannot hold..





2} such that ²n → 0,a sn →∞ ,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes (57), (61),
(62), and ∀ω ∆1(ω),∆2(ω) ≤ K. The condition (61), (63) implied by (62)
and ∀ω ∆1(ω),∆2(ω) ≤ K imply that the sequence lies in a compact set, and




2) be its limit, where
(∆0
1,∆0
2) supports C with probability more than 1/2 f o re a c hp l a y e rw h e n² =0 .
However, since we can regard Y1 and Y2 as a single outcome Y when ² =0 , the
following inequality holds as in Proposition 20.



































This contradicts the fact that the limit (∆0
1,∆0
2) also satisﬁes (62).
Note that given K>0, t h ec h o i c eo f² is independent of the initial choice of
(v0
1,v0
2) and v∗ in the above proof. If ² chosen is small enough, then ∀ω ∆1(ω),∆2(ω) ≤




A = {(∆1,∆2)|∆1 + ∆2 ≤ 0 and − 2/r ≤ ∆1 + ∆2},a n d
B(K)=A ∩ {(∆1,∆2)|∆1,∆2 ≤ K}.
Conditions (61), (63) and Lemma 22 implies that we can always choose (small
enough) ² in such a way that for some ω, (∆1(ω),∆2(ω)) lies in the region A\B.
Let us now summarize what we have found as follows.
Proposition 23 For any (large) K>0,w ec a nﬁn dav a l u eo ft h es i g n a l
distribution parameter ²>0 for which the following holds: Let v∗ ∈ (0,1) be
t h eb e s ts y m m e t r i cP P Ep a y o ﬀ under discount factor δ.T h e n , t h e r e e x i s t s a
feasible payoﬀ proﬁle (v0
1,v0
2) such that v0
1 + v0









∩{v | v1+v2 ≤ 2v∗, 7v1+v2 ≤ 8, v1+7v2 ≤ 8} 6= ∅.
(64)
As this condition (64) becomes more stringent as K →∞ ,i fw ec h o o s e
(small) ² that corresponds to a large K, we need a fairly large discount factor δ
40to support v∗. Note that condition (64) is satisﬁed if δ is suﬃciently large, as in
Figure A. Hence, when we have the situation depicted in Figure B with small δ,
condition (64) fails for any feasible payoﬀ proﬁle (v0
1,v0
2) such that v0
1+v0
2 =2 v∗.
Therefore, the value of δ given by Figure B is a lower bound of the discount





























The value of v0
1 is obtained by solving v1 + v2 =2 v∗ and v1 +7 v2 =8 ,a n dw e
ﬁnd v0
1 = 7v∗−4
3 . Similarly, v00
1 is determined by v1 + v2 =2 v∗ − (1−δ
δ )2
r and






6 . By plugging those in equation





r +8 ( 1− v∗)
. (66)
Note that this is an increasing function with δ(1) = 1 and δ(0) → 1 as K →∞ .
This means that to support any positive value, we need a fairly large discount
factor when the signal distribution parameter ² is small (hence K is large). The

















By the deﬁnition of this function, the maximum symmetric PPE payoﬀ under
δ must be located to the right of the graph of v(δ), and hence v(δ) is an upper
bound of the maximum symmetric PPE payoﬀ under δ, whenever it is positive.
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